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I: Introduction 
 The default demographic characteristics of a United States politician are straight, White, 
and male. While it is not uncommon for politicians to possess one less historically advantaged 
demographic trait, it is exceedingly rare for any politician to deviate from that default in more 
than one respect. As a result, the American people look to their government and see that it is 
composed overwhelmingly of one type of person, the type of person who has historically held 
every economic and social advantage. Many Americans do not resemble straight White men; 
many Americans are people of color, women, queer, or embody some combination of these 
historically oppressed traits. Why isn’t our government made up of bodies which more 
accurately represent the bodies of the governed? 
 To claim that the problem lies with the disadvantaged individuals is uncharitable at best 
and bigoted at worst. There is no genetic predisposition which prevents women from running for 
office, nor is there anything inherent to a queer person that makes them disinterested in serving 
as an elected representative. Instead, the problem lies with the American political system, which 
is so arranged as to disadvantage people who do not fit into the demographic default. They are 
discouraged from running for office, and when they do run, they have a harder time of it. These 
basic points form the foundation that underlies my argument, and they are not controversial. 
 The purpose of this project is to examine the ways in which differently atypical 
candidates are differently disadvantaged in attempting to run for office. Is the experience of a 
Black man the same as that of a White man? What about that of a gay man and a straight man, or 
a White man and a White woman? These questions are basic, and it can easily be assumed that in 
all likelihood, the experiences are different. It is much more interesting and informative to 
compare across disadvantaged categories, especially with multiply disadvantaged individuals. 
What struggles does a Black woman face compared to an Asian man? Is it easier for queer 
women or queer men to raise money? Is a White woman or a man of color more likely to have 
political ambition, or does the answer depend on a racial breakdown more nuanced than the 
umbrella category “of color”? These are the questions that inspired this thesis. 
 In order to study the experiences of demographically disadvantaged people within our 
political system, I look at three different types of demographic category: gender, race, and 
sexuality. I examine these categories because they are the ones most commonly invoked when 
we talk about identity in America – while something like class might be an equally valid 
category to study, these three appear much more frequently in the discourse. While political 
scientists like Martin Gilens have done work regarding class and political power (Gilens 2012), 
his interest area has far fewer scholars focusing on it than the aforementioned three. To narrow 
the scope of the project, I study three areas of campaigning which I believe are crucial for 
electoral success: political ambition, recruitment, and fundraising. By studying ambition, I can 
learn what kinds of demographic traits people who do decide to run for office possess, and can 
compare across categories to learn what type of atypical candidate is least likely to consider 
starting a campaign. Studying recruitment provides a unique view into the inner workings of the 
political system by revealing what demographic traits the party machinery seeks out when it 
recruits and supports new candidates. At the end of the day, recruiters are people, and all people 
are biased, so studying the biases of recruiters can reveal what types of people are not sought out 
for candidacies. Finally, fundraising is necessary to keep any campaign not run by an 
independently wealthy candidate afloat, and since I am studying candidates who have been 
historically oppressed and are not likely to be independently wealthy, an understanding of who 
can fundraise successfully is vital. 
 My intent is not to establish what kind of candidate is the most disadvantaged by our 
political system; I am not interested in claiming that one oppressed group is more oppressed than 
every other oppressed group.  Rather, I intend to show that candidates who possess different 
demographically disadvantageous traits are differently disadvantaged. Any political analysis of a 
disadvantaged group requires nuance, and I would even go so far as to say that any analysis 
which is not intersectional is incomplete. My thesis is that the different disadvantages faced by 
different demographic groups are so distinct that grouping them all into the category of “not 
straight white men” is entirely insufficient, and further that failing to adequately distinguish 
between different demographically disadvantaged groups tends to erase the difficulties faced by 
one group in favor of those faced by another.  
 This paper is in large part a response to the current state of the literature, which is in my 
opinion insufficiently nuanced when it comes to analyses of oppressed groups. Take, for 
example, the oft-repeated claim that there is a gender ambition gap which suppresses the 
ambition of women, and that the ambition gap is the most important factor in the disparity 
between men and women in office. This claim is not adequately intersectional. I do not mean that 
no author has ever conducted an intersectional analysis of ambition in women – in fact, Lawless 
and Fox are careful to assert that the gender ambition gap persists across races, and provide 
numbers to back that up. However, the claim is still insufficient, because the gender ambition 
gap in Black candidates looks wildly different than it does in White candidates. It does exist, but 
it is substantially smaller. As such, the claim that follows the first one, which asserts that the 
gender ambition gap is the most prevalent reason for the gender disparity among elected 
officials, is much weaker with regard to Black women. This is especially significant when one 
compares the fundraising ability of White and Black women, since Black women tend to raise 
significantly less money than White women; who’s to say that the gender ambition gap impacts 
Black women more than their fundraising difficulties do?  
Making blanket claims about demographic categories, even if those claims are in the 
most technical sense true, tends to result in analyses which silently advantage one group over the 
other, and as a result is inadequate if we want to accurately assess the problems different 
demographic groups face in running for office. In order to correctly identify and begin to 
mitigate the problems faced by different minority groups in running for office, we must work 
with a careful eye towards the factors that make each group unique. 
II: Literature Review 
 This literature review will focus on my three demographics of interest, namely women, 
people of color, and queer people. I will describe the different ways that each demographic deals 
with the three types of campaign obstacle, namely ambition, recruitment, and fundraising. I will 
explain certain basic concepts as they become relevant, and I progress through the categories, I 
will build an intersectional approach where possible. Note that certain things are present in this 
literature review which I was unable to test for on my own – namely, I was unable to devise a 
way to collect data on recruitment, and was similarly unable to collect data for nascent political 
ambition. In the data section, nascent ambition is replaced with expressive ambition, and 
recruitment is entirely absent. 
Demographic I: Women 
Category I: Ambition 
 Much of the candidate-side literature regarding underrepresented demographics focuses 
on the ambition gap between men and women. In simplest terms, the gender ambition gap means 
that far more men are politically ambitious than women. The existence of the gender ambition 
gap has been well established in the literature (Rozell 2000; Lawless 2012; Preece, Stoddard, & 
Fisher 2016; Fox & Lawless 2017; Doherty, Dowling, & Miller 2019), and I do not intend to 
contest that concept here.  
 The word “ambition” is vague and can include a number of different definitions. As such, 
it is useful to define the term more clearly. Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox have done 
extensive work to provide clear definitions of different kinds of ambition, three of which in 
particular are relevant here. The broadest definition of ambition is what Fox and Lawless in their 
2005 study call nascent ambition. Nascent ambition is an abstraction, first defined by Fox and 
Lawless as “the inclination to consider a candidacy.” The second, narrower type of ambition, 
defined by Fox and Lawless in opposition to their novel term nascent ambition, is expressive 
ambition. A candidate has expressive ambition when they begin to take steps towards achieving 
office, and no candidate can possess expressive ambition without first possessing nascent 
ambition (Fox & Lawless 2005). The third and narrowest type of ambition is progressive 
ambition, explored at length by Fulton et al. Progressive ambition is the ambition of candidates 
who are currently in office to run for higher levels of office rather than staying in their current 
seat (Fulton et al 2006). For example, a mayor who wants to run for the presidency has 
progressive ambition; a mayor who runs for their office as an incumbent time and time again 
does not. 
 The difference between nascent and expressive ambition is an important one, but it is a 
difference which has only fairly recently been established. Fox and Lawless point out that most 
of the literature focuses on expressive ambition and either fails to account for nascent ambition 
entirely or focuses on it only secondarily. Since their 2005 study, Lawless has written further on 
it (Lawless 2012) and other researchers have incorporated nascent ambition into their work as 
well (Robbins & Florence 2015; Silva & Skulley 2019). These terms for ambition apply to more 
demographic categories than gender, but the literature on ambition, both nascent and expressive, 
is most expansive with regard to gender.  
 Perhaps the most basic way to measure nascent ambition in people is to ask whether they 
are interested in running for office. Surveys like this can be very revealing, especially when they 
are intersectional and ask questions about different levels of office. For example, in a 2017 study, 
Fox and Lawless report that among surveyed college students, women are less likely than men to 
indicate an interest in running for office. When asked more specific questions, women were also 
less likely than men to indicate interest in jobs that were in any way related to politics, including 
such relatively low-stakes positions as mayorship (Fox & Lawless 2017).  
In their 2005 study, the same researchers explore more complex methods of measuring 
nascent ambition. They surveyed only people who they considered to be in the “candidate 
eligibility pool” for running for office. They define the eligibility pool as containing people who 
work in one of the four pipeline professions. These are the professions most likely to lead to 
candidacies, which are the legal, business, educational, and activist fields. They then drew a 
national sample of individuals from that eligibility pool and asked them questions about how 
they feel about potentially running for office. Using this survey, they determined that women in 
the eligibility pool, who are similarly qualified to the men in the eligibility pool to run for office, 
are twice as likely to consider themselves “not at all qualified” to run for office. Further, as the 
importance of the office increases, i.e. moving from local to federal positions, women are 
increasingly less likely to consider running for office (Fox & Lawless 2005). Based on the 
questions asked in this survey, and in agreement with work done by Conway in 2001, Fox and 
Lawless conclude that the development of nascent ambition is influenced by the presence or 
absence of a “politicized upbringing” (Fox & Lawless 2005; Conway 2001). Being raised in a 
politically-involved environment increases nascent ambition, as does early parental 
encouragement for running for office; Fox, Lawless, and Conway are all in agreement that 
women are generally socialized to be unobtrusive and to stay out of the public eye, which is in 
direct opposition to a politicized upbringing. As such, women tend to have lower nascent 
ambition compared to men, who are often encouraged from young ages to be leaders and public 
figures. Conway takes these conclusions a few steps further, noting that the socialization of 
young women discourages them from pursuing activist work as well. Activists often gain skills 
that make them more qualified to run for office, so women are neither encouraged to nor taught 
how to run for office during their formative years (Conway 2001). This severely decreases their 
nascent ambition as compared to men. 
Lawless takes up the question of nascent ambition again in 2012. In this later study, she 
examines the pipeline professions that make up the eligibility pool for candidates. She points out 
that these professions are dominated by white men, which means that not only is any given 
woman less likely to possess nascent ambition than any given man, there are far fewer of them 
who could possibly possess it to begin with. In this study, Lawless also notes an interaction 
effect between income and likelihood of pursuing a candidacy. Having money makes a person 
less likely to consider running for office, since the private sector tends to be much more lucrative 
than public service. However, having money makes running a campaign much easier, so 
potential candidates who are moderately wealthy might be less likely to run in order to accrue 
more wealth, whereas potential candidates who are extremely wealthy might be tempted to use 
that wealth to fund their campaign, since they will have enough left over to live comfortably 
even with a diminished income (Lawless 2012). This is significant because women tend to be 
less wealthy than men, as they are less frequently members of high-income professions, and as a 
result tend to be less able to comfortably fund a campaign than men, which diminishes their 
ambition. 
In the most basic sense, the expressive ambition of women is the same as that of any 
other demographic group: Women run for office strategically, running only in races that they 
think they actually stand a chance of winning (Conti 2002; Doherty, Dowling, & Miller 2019). 
However, the majority of people don’t operate entirely on a strategic level – the decision to run is 
also influenced by attitudinal dispositions, personal experiences, and demographic characteristics 
(Fox & Lawless 2005). So, while women do run strategically, these other factors also influence 
their expressive ambition, especially with regard to their perception of their own qualifications as 
candidates. Recall, for example, the Fox and Lawless study of the eligibility pool in which 
eligible women considered themselves “less qualified” than eligible men. Conway also points 
out that women tend to vastly underestimate their own qualifications (Conway 2001). As a result, 
while women do consider candidacies strategically, they also undervalue themselves, making 
them less likely to enter races that they could in fact possibly win. 
In 2006, Fulton et al published the results of a study which serves as a comprehensive 
analysis of progressive ambition in women. This study claims that women are likely to possess 
characteristics that lead to diminished progressive ambition. Fulton et al, as well as Conway in 
2001, point out that women are still expected to perform domestic duties and to raise children; 
because of this, many women who might have nascent ambition and be tempted to become 
candidates will wait until their child is an adult. Since older people are less likely to run for high 
office as first-time candidates, many women who don’t get started in politics until later in life 
will either not run for office at all or stick to local positions (Fulton et al 2006). A related factor 
is that surveyed women with children tend to be less ambitious than women without children, 
whereas men with children are not less ambitious than men without children.  
Most of the Fulton et al study deals with the opinions of state legislators. When surveyed, 
female state legislators reported that generally they are less likely to expect benefits from 
running for higher office once they’ve already achieved one office. Since mustering the ambition 
to run in the first place is so difficult, most of the women surveyed said that they had no interest 
in running again for a higher office when they could instead utilize their incumbency advantage 
to achieve a relatively easy re-election. Further, the women surveyed were much more likely to 
believe that their state-level office is as important as a federal-level office than the men surveyed 
were (Fulton et al 2006). Thus, not only is running for a higher office after achieving a state-
level office extremely difficult, women tend to see less of a benefit in doing it than men do.  
The literature indicates that, compared to men, women face decreased levels of nascent, 
expressive, and progressive ambition. Some researchers have begun studying how to decrease 
these ambition gaps. Preece, Stoddard, and Fisher point out that recruitment is generally a good 
way of increasing ambition – but women don’t get recruited at nearly the same rate as men 
(Preece, Stoddard, & Fisher 2016). Holman and Schneider conducted a study that explores the 
framing of ambition narratives. The simplest assumption that people make to account for the lack 
of women in office is that there is some sort of deficiency on the part of women – this is what 
Holman and Schneider call a supply-side framing. They suggest that switching to a demand-side 
framing, one which makes clear the social and institutional disadvantages that female candidates 
and would-be candidates face, would increase ambition among women. To support this theory, 
they conducted an online survey in which they primed multiple treatment groups of women 
differently. Some of the women were shown a paragraph explaining that fewer women are in 
office because of factors internal to women; others were shown a paragraph explaining various 
social and institutional factors which diminish ambition in women. Those women who were 
primed with a supply-side framing answered the subsequent questions, many of which were 
about political ambition and potential future careers, with responses that suggested higher 
ambition than those who were primed with a demand-side framing (Holman & Schneider 2018).  
Category II: Recruitment 
Recruitment is the process by which people involved with the political world, often party 
officials, activists, or elected representatives, seek out potential candidates and support their 
efforts to win office. Recruitment is helpful because it both identifies candidates who otherwise 
would not have considered or felt confident running and gives them some of the resources and 
expertise necessary to mount a successful campaign. Further, recruitment can be a useful tool to 
counteract low political ambition – if a certain demographic tends to be less ambitious than 
average, then theoretically, recruitment that specifically targets that demographic should increase 
their likelihood of running (Preece, Stoddard, & Fisher 2016). 
Unfortunately, most of the literature indicates that women are not recruited as often as 
men. Successful female candidates report having been recruited much less often than successful 
male candidates (Silva & Skulley 2019) and women who are as qualified to hold office as men – 
which, due to the historical oppression of women, is already a small population – are less likely 
than equally qualified men to be recruited, to be approached by a recruiter multiple times, and to 
be recruited by multiple sources (Preece, Stoddard, & Fisher 2016). This is especially damning 
because being recruited by multiple sources is key for the development of expressive ambition, 
but even those women who are recruited are very rarely approached by multiple sources. 
Political networks tend to be overwhelmingly male, and the three most common types of 
recruiter – party leaders, elected officials, and activists – also tend to be male. Recruiters tend to 
recruit people who have similar demographic characteristics to them, and men especially tend to 
recruit other men (Conway 2001), so the overwhelming gender disparity among recruiters makes 
women less likely to be recruited. Additionally, Republican political networks tend to have an 
even greater gender disparity, so the recruitment gap for Republican women is even wider than 
the recruitment gap for women in general (Preece, Stoddard, & Fisher 2016; Lawless 2012).  
In addition to perceived favorable demographic characteristics, recruiters recruit people 
based on whether they think a candidate will be well-received by the base – after all, they want 
to recruit people who can win (Doherty, Dowling, & Miller 2019). This means that a recruiter’s 
beliefs about candidate viability are as or more important than actual voter opinions, which poses 
a problem for women. Although women tend to receive electoral support comparable to men 
when they do run, it’s very easy for someone to assume that a woman is less of a “safe bet” than 
a similarly-qualified man. Further, because gender is an immediately identifiable trait for most 
people, recruiters often assume that gender as a trait dwarfs other traits; for example, a voter 
might note that a candidate is female and assume that they are progressive, while in fact that 
candidate may support something like gun ownership rights. Since being male has been the 
default among candidates for so long, a voter sees a female candidate and immediately notes that 
they are different than the norm, which leads that voter to make incorrect assumptions that may 
turn them away from the candidate – or so the thinking goes (Doherty, Dowling, & Miller 2019). 
Logic like that makes recruiters, especially male recruiters, hesitant to recruit women based on 
viability concerns. It is important to note here that the Doherty, Dowling, and Miller study, when 
it tested these hypotheses on actual party chairs, found that these party chairs were equally likely 
to recruit hypothetical male and female candidates, but the researchers point out that they 
randomly assigned male-gendered careers and characteristics to female-presenting candidates. 
Real women often don’t have access to jobs that are traditionally held by men, and those high-
powered and high-paying jobs are favored by recruiters, so although the results of their test 
contradict the theories they presented, their testing was of questionable applicability to real-
world female candidates.  
Not only are women recruited less often than men, some studies show that women are as 
a whole harder to recruit than men (Preece, Stoddard, & Fisher 2016). In a 2016 experiment, 
researchers held an information session for the Utah Republican Party. They invited women and 
men using the same invitations, but far fewer women than men responded; after the session, they 
asked attendees whether they would consider running for office if encouraged by a party leader 
to do so, and while both men and women had higher ambition than average after the information 
session, men were much more affected than women were. This indicates that women can’t be 
recruited in the same way that men are – the same tactics don’t necessarily have the same effect 
across the gender divide. Of course, the fact that the study was conducted on Republicans may 
have skewed the results, since conservative women are generally thought to be less politically 
ambitious than progressive women, but Republican women are still women, and seem to face 
greater difficulties in running for office than Democratic women. 
The discussion of conservative versus progressive women is an interesting one, because 
groups that exist to support women’s campaigns tend to have political positions beyond gender 
considerations. EMILY’s List supports only progressive pro-choice women, whereas the smaller 
National Women’s Political Caucus actively seeks out pro-ERA and pro-choice women (Rozzell 
2000). As a result, the solution to the recruitment gap isn’t as simple as just “recruiting more 
women.” Seemingly in response to this, the National Organization for Women was founded with 
the express goal of flooding the political arena with female candidates of all types, regardless of 
policy positions or perceived candidate viability. That said, of the groups mentioned above, 
EMILY’s List is by far the largest and most financially successful, so progressive women, who 
already face a slightly less prohibitive recruitment gap, receive more support than conservative 
women, who arguably need it more.  
Category III: Fundraising 
The literature is thoroughly divided as to whether or not women face fundraising barriers 
when compared to men. Some claim that women fundraise as well as or better than men, in large 
part due to the support of groups like EMILY’s list which are dedicated explicitly to raising 
money to counteract the fact that women tend to have less money than men (Conti 2002). Others 
claim that women who have run for office report fundraising as being one of the most difficult 
parts of their campaign, and that although fundraising is certainly difficult for most candidates, it 
is more difficult for women than men (Sanbonmatsu 2015; Barber, Butler, & Preece 2016). 
 Fortunately, researchers have noticed this conflict in the literature and taken steps to 
explain it. In a recent paper, Thomson and Swers point out that some women can fundraise as 
successfully as men, and attempt to determine which women can and can’t do that. In terms of 
individual donations, donors tend to give money to people who look like them. This means that 
men tend to donate overwhelmingly to men, and women are more likely to donate to women 
when they do donate – this is called the “gender affinity” effect (Thomson & Swers 2017). 
However, women tend to donate money to candidates far less often than men, and in smaller 
amounts (Barber, Butler, & Preece 2016; Lawless 2012). This means that male candidates 
receive a good deal of financial support from male donors, whereas female candidates receive 
fewer male donors and rely on female donors, who are less prevalent than male donors and have 
less to give, so men find it easier in general to raise money from individual contributors. Of 
course, gender is not the only relevant factor; ideology matters as well. Here it is again apparent 
that Republican women have a more difficult time of it than Democratic women, because when 
male donors do give to female candidates, they are far more likely to give to Democratic than 
Republican women.  
 Thomson and Swers expand their discussion of gender affinity along ideological lines by 
asking whether the gender affinity effect can really be said to hold true in both parties. Looking 
specifically at gendered donor breakdowns among Democrats and Republicans, they determine 
that Democratic female candidates raise more money from women than Democratic men do; this 
advantage is necessary for them to keep up with male candidates financially. Conversely, 
Democratic male candidates raise significantly more from male donors than Democratic female 
candidates do. While Thomson and Swers suspect that gender affinity is at play here, they also 
point out that male and female politicians have access to different support networks – just like 
with recruitment, most organizations that fundraise for candidates are male-dominated, making it 
easier for men to flourish in them. 
 In contrast to the discussion of gender affinity among Democrats, among Republicans 
gender affinity is only half effective. Republican male candidates raise more money from male 
than female donors, as expected. However, Republican female candidates are not benefitted by 
their gender in the same way that Democratic female candidates are – while Democratic female 
candidates can energize women, who otherwise do not donate very often, to donate to their 
campaigns, Republican female candidates receive fewer individual donations than the average 
candidate, and do not see any substantial bump in female donors as compared to their male 
counterparts. To move the discussion more towards ideology than party identification, Thomson 
and Swers note that Democratic female donors tend to prefer more progressive candidates 
overall, which does not necessarily mean female candidates, while Republican female donors 
tend to prefer more conservative candidates. Thus, female donors tend to prefer more 
ideologically radical candidates than men do; this does not in and of itself advantage Democrats 
or Republicans, but since PACs that donate to women tend to favor more progressive women, it 
does mean that Republican women may have to choose between losing individual donors or 
losing PAC support.  
 All of that being said, women do raise about as much money as men on average; how can 
we reconcile that with the frequent reporting that women feel that fundraising is 
disproportionately more difficult for them? Just as women have to be far more qualified than 
men to feel that they are adequately prepared to run for office, women have to work far harder to 
fundraise the same amount of money that men do. Democratic women, for example, often rely 
on grassroots fundraising from very many small donors, which, as mentioned above, does not 
come to them easily. Women have to work hard to energize support from a large number of 
individual donors in order to compete with male candidates, but those candidates who were 
successful were successful in large part because they were able to work harder than men to 
achieve the same results. 
 Since women tend to struggle with large individual donations, female candidates might 
want to rely on PAC support instead. While a great many PACs are organized around specific 
policy issues and are likely gender-neutral when it comes to who they support, women do have 
the advantage of the existence of PACs dedicated specifically to electing women, the most 
successful of which, as mentioned before, is EMILY’s List. PACs help candidates get seed 
money, which is a very important concept, especially for candidates who come from oppressed 
groups and struggle with questions of candidate viability and electability. Seed money is money 
that candidates receive early on in the election cycle, and often is used to facilitate further 
fundraising, more widespread name recognition, and a general perception of institutional support 
which is often conflated with electability (Francia 2008; Lawless & Fox 2017). However, as I 
briefly discussed above, women’s PACs give much more money to progressive than 
conservative women. In fact, EMILY’s List refuses to support conservative candidates, and the 
Women’s Campaign Fund gives on average about 80% of their contributions to Democrats. 
When Democratic female candidates receive seed money from a women’s PAC, they go on to 
raise between two and four times as much as the women who do not; Republican women, on the 
other hand, often receive so little seed money that it does not even impact their future fundraising 
(Francia 2008). Women’s PACs for pro-choice and Republican candidates do exist – the 
aforementioned National Women’s Political Caucus, for example, both recruits and fundraises 
for Democrats and Republicans, and the Women in the Senate and House PAC (WISH List) is 
explicitly pro-choice. These groups, however, tend to have less money and a lower membership 
than their progressive counterparts (Rozzell 2000).  
 Before moving on, it is worth drawing out in explicit detail a comparison between 
fundraising and recruitment. Both of these elements of campaigns require social networking, and 
most social networks for both fundraising and recruitment are male-dominated. Just as with 
recruitment, one of the greatest self-reported barriers to the success of female candidates is the 
“boy’s club” nature of fundraising groups (Barber, Butler, & Preece 2016). That fact, combined 
with Conti’s assertion that women are more likely to struggle with asking for money than men 
even if they do have access to a friendly network, means that the traditional institutions of 
American politics are arrayed against female candidates. Women struggle to fundraise not only 
because of donor patterns, but also because the systems that are in place to help candidates win 
elections are hostile to them.  
 Although the literature on female candidate fundraising is far from unified, a cohesive 
narrative does exist. Women, generally, can raise as much money as men, as long as they are 
committed to working harder to secure individual donations from people who would not 
normally donate than men have to. Democratic women have an easier time of it compared to 
Republican women, who suffer from a lack of institutional support as well as from a lack of a 
helpful gender affinity effect among conservative female donors. Finally, fundraising is a social 
affair, and the social networks that allow American political candidates to fundraise are generally 
hostile to women, even if they are technically open to them. 
DEMOGRAPHIC II: PEOPLE OF COLOR 
CATEGORY I: AMBITION 
 The political ambition of people of color has been studied less extensively than the 
political ambition of women. In her 2012 book, Lawless writes: “Almost no research specifically 
addresses race or ethnicity in the candidate emergence process at all” (Lawless 2012). Shah 
claims, and I have found in my research to be true, that most literature on people of color as 
candidates asks whether people are willing to vote for candidates of color, not whether people of 
color have any interest in running (Shah 2014). Of course, the blanket term “people of color” 
contains many different subdivisions – even without accounting for the gender and sexuality, a 
Black American’s experience of the political system may be entirely different from that of an 
Asian or Latinx American. Whenever possible, I have distinguished between people of color as a 
blanket category and the specific ethnicities which make it up. Unfortunately, much of the 
literature, especially the older literature, reduces the racial divide in America to a white/nonwhite 
binary, so that distinction is often not made. 
Conti claims that a great many people of color run for office – the problem isn’t running, 
it’s winning, which differentiates people of color from (White) women dramatically (Conti 
2002). Shah finds that to be true in his Louisiana case study, but notes that Louisiana has a 
higher Black population than the national average (Shah 2014). Much of the literature disagrees 
with Conti’s claim, although there isn’t a unified theory of the intersection of race, gender, and 
ambition. A Fox and Lawless study, for example, shows that Black men and women in the 
eligibility pool are less likely than White men and women in the eligibility pool to indicate that 
they have ever considered running for office (Fox & Lawless 2005); in another work, Lawless 
claims that people of color tend to be less ambitious than White people generally, but that the 
gender gap in ambition is roughly the same across the races (Lawless 2012). Lawless also claims 
that race does not exert a statistically significant effect on expressive ambition, whereas gender 
does; instead, race mostly influences nascent ambition (Lawless 2012). In a more nuanced 
analysis of ambition in people of color, Holman and Schneider claim that the gender gap in 
ambition varies substantially across races, with Black people facing the smallest ambition gap 
among people of color and Asian people facing the largest (Holman & Schneider 2018). 
Although some of the claims made in the literature are contradictory, the general consensus is 
that 1. people of color overall are less ambitious than White people; 2. there is a gender gap in 
ambition among every racial group; 3. the gender gap in ambition is smallest among White 
people and largest among Asian people. 
 In her 2012 book, Lawless points out that one of the keys to the development of nascent 
political ambition is the presence of role models. Possibly as a substitute for parental 
encouragement as a child, the recognition that other people sharing the same demographic 
characteristic as a potential candidate have proven that people with those characteristics can run 
for and achieve office serves to increase ambition. Unfortunately, people of color don’t have 
very many political role models. When people of color do enter the political sphere, they tend to 
serve in local offices rather than federal ones (Conti 2002; Shah 2014), and those offices appear 
less prominently in the media. Thus, as far as the development of nascent ambition goes, people 
of color face an issue that women also face. This discussion necessarily must be intersectional, 
because a person may identify strongly with more than one demographic trait – for example, a 
Black woman might not see a White Congresswoman or a Black Congressman as a role model, 
because she may identify herself as a Black woman rather than as a woman who is also Black. 
So, while White women and people of color generally all lack role models, women of color feel 
that lack more acutely, especially (as will be discussed shortly) Asian women. 
 The intersectional nature of ambition among women of color is especially important 
when one adopts a historical perspective, which is important for understanding the material 
conditions that minority groups currently inhabit in America. Minority groups in America have 
been historically separated both from other minority groups and from Whites, which has led to 
the development of different gender structures in different racial groups – this helps explain the 
different severities of the ambition gap in different racial demographics (Robbins & Florence 
2015). This also means that what causes or reduces political ambition in White women does not 
necessarily cause or reduce it in Black women, or that it may do so for Black women but not for 
Asian or Latina women, and so on. In their study, Robbins and Florence find that minorities of 
all gender identifications tend to have a more favorable opinion of working mothers than White 
people do. This is significant because White women are substantially less likely to have 
expressive political ambition if they are raising children, while the minority women that these 
researchers studied were actually more likely to be ambitious if they were mothers. This pattern 
holds at the .001 level of significance, and represents a substantial difference between White 
women and women of color that makes discussions of “political ambition in women” in general 
inadequate unless they include intersectional analyses.  
 In a case study which samples candidates from the entire state of Louisiana from 1990 to 
2010, Shah examines the political ambition of Black candidates. He makes several claims which, 
although they are based on a specific area of the country, can be generalized to the nation as a 
whole. Black candidates in Louisiana were more likely to be female than male, and to be 
Democratic than Republican; they were also more likely to run in areas with a large Black 
population. Black candidates who ran were less likely than White candidates to win office, but 
Black incumbents were more likely than White incumbents to seek higher office rather than 
running for the same position with an incumbency advantage. Thus, in this study, not only did 
Black candidates not suffer from an ambition problem relative to White candidates, they actually 
demonstrated higher progressive ambition than White candidates. Recall that surveyed female 
State Legislators indicated that they would rather remain in their current offices than run for 
higher office; the Shah and Fulton et al studies are not necessarily incompatible, as 93% of the 
state legislators surveyed by Fulton et al are White. This does serve to indicate, again, that 
attempting to make broad claims about women without intersectional considerations can very 
easily backfire. None of these are necessarily generalizable to the country at large, as Louisiana’s 
Black population is larger than the national proportion, and the data I will present directly 
contradict the first claim on the federal level, but what follows is, I believe, broadly 
generalizable. Ultimately, Shah makes three generalizable claims from out of his case study: 
first, Black candidates are less likely to win races than White candidates; second, identifying as a 
Democrat makes a Black candidate more likely to win; finally, Black women are more likely 
than Black men to win a race. This last point is extremely significant, because again, studies of 
women generally tend to conclude that women are about as likely as men to win their races, 
whereas Shah’s claim is that Black women are more likely than Black men to win.  
 Shah points out that it is extremely difficult to find work which deals with ambition in 
people of color, and this difficulty is even greater when looking for work focusing on Asian and 
Latinx ambition. Sanbonmatsu argues that Asian women are socialized more than any other 
demographic to work behind the scenes and to be submissive, which indicates that their ambition 
should be lower than any other racial and gender category (Sanbonmatsu 2015). Writing in a 
similar vein, Silva and Skulley claim that Black and Latina women should have lower ambition 
than White women, but higher ambition than Asian women (Silva & Skulley 2019).  
Silva and Skulley collected data for all women who ran for House seats between 1980 
and 2018, and came to several conclusions as to the strategic considerations that Black and 
Latina women have to make when considering running. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they discovered 
that minority women, especially Latinas, tend to run in majority-nonwhite districts. While it 
would be easy to assume that minority women will be more likely to run in progressive districts 
because progressives are more likely to support minority candidates, this is not universally the 
case. Black women were actually less likely to run in extremely liberal districts. Although they 
did run primarily in liberal-leaning districts, it is possible that Black women are hesitant to 
unseat progressive incumbents in extremely liberal districts, and therefore choose not to run to 
avoid fragmenting the left and potentially weakening the progressive movement. This is 
noteworthy because it seems to be a consideration White women do not make – in this particular 
regard, Black women have to make their strategic considerations even more stringently than 
White women.  
 Asian people, who already have drastically low levels of ambition, face a unique problem 
among people of color. The word “Asian” is used in America to represent very many ethnicities, 
most of which have unique cultural identities. For example, a Japanese person and a Vietnamese 
person may have more in common than a Japanese person and a British person, but that fact does 
not mean that they have a set of shared experiences strong enough to justify putting them in the 
same racial category. As a result of this lack of panethnic unification, many Asian-Americans 
surveyed indicate that it is more important to them to see, for example, a Chinese-American 
candidate than a generally Asian-American candidate (Sanbonmatsu 2015). This lack of 
panethnic unification clashes with the American oversimplification of race to create a 
remarkably difficult situation for potential Asian candidates, who may find themselves struggling 
to win over voters who Americans would consider to be in the same racial category as them as 
well as White voters. Awareness of this complex situation might make Asian candidates less 
likely to run, since their strategic consideration of their potential voter base will indicate to them 
that they would struggle to gain widespread support. 
CATEGORY II: RECRUITMENT 
 It is important to maintain a historical materialist perspective when discussing the current 
status of racial issues. Recruiters typically seek out people who occupy one of the four pipeline 
professions mentioned before – law, business, education, and political activism. People of color, 
due to their history of social and economic oppression, are less likely to hold jobs in those 
pipeline professions, making them less visible in the recruitment pool (Albright 2014). This 
compounds the racial considerations that recruiters might make in seeking out recruits, 
potentially double-penalizing people of color in the recruitment process. 
 Because recruitment is a person-to-person activity, there is always a risk of demographic 
bias on the part of the recruiter. This risk is especially concerning with regard to race. Doherty, 
Dowling, and Miller address this concern in a study in which they try to determine whether 
recruiters allow race to mask other characteristics relevant to electoral viability, and as such 
don’t take people of color as seriously as they should based on their actual merits (Doherty, 
Dowling, & Miller 2019). In this study, party chairs – one of the primary electoral gatekeepers 
and recruiters – indicated their belief that hypothetical candidates with Black or Hispanic names 
are significantly less likely to win elections, and as such, are less desirable as recruits. Once 
again, however, an intersectional perspective is required – this same study showed that party 
chairs felt that hypothetical Black and Hispanic women are more likely to win than their male 
counterparts. Thus, while people of color overall are less likely to be recruited than White 
people, within racial categories women are more likely than men to be recruited, which does not 
seem to be the case for White people. I imagine that, on balance, fewer women of color will be 
recruited than White women, but that the gender ratio of recruitment will be more favorable to 
women of color than to White women. 
 When discussing recruitment among oppressed demographics, it is always important to 
consider the difference between perception and reality. I have already discussed that, while 
women tend to perform as well as men electorally, there is a fear among party elites that they 
will underperform; the same goes for people of color. There is a frequently-held assumption 
among party elites that White voters will not vote for Black candidates; a 2004 study shows, 
however, that Democrats will vote for Democrats regardless of the racial identity of the 
candidate. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to either not vote or vote for a different 
party rather than voting for a Black candidate, but partisan identity is still very important for 
Republican voters (Highton 2004). So, while we might worry that voters will panic at the 
thought of candidates of color, the data suggest that partisanship usually trumps race. Regardless 
of the reality of the situation, however, these assumptions still exist, and still negatively affect 
oppressed groups. 
 Partisanship affects the recruitment of people of color in one other notable way. Recall 
that recruiters tend to recruit people who share their demographic characteristics, which are 
overwhelmingly white and male. The type of recruiter least likely to be a white male is the 
nonelected activist; Democrats often allow recruitment to take place through nonelected activists, 
whereas Republicans prefer that party chairs and elected officials do their recruiting. As a result, 
Democratic people of color have better odds of being recruited than Republican people of color 
(Lawless 2012). This mirrors the problem that Republican women face in fundraising – their 
demographic characteristic combines with their partisan identity to create a uniquely difficult 
situation for them.  
 Recruitment doesn’t work the same for all racial groups. It’s a very important event for 
groups with low self-esteem, because recruitment can trigger the rapid growth of ambition in 
people who otherwise have very little. As a result, recruitment is much more important for 
Hispanic and Asian women, who tend to have less ambition than Black and White women. 
Similarly, recruitment is much more important across the board for women of color than for men 
of color, and more important for people of color generally than White people generally (Robbins 
& Florence 2015).  
Before moving on, it should be noted that one study finds that Black people are more 
likely to be approached by recruiters than White people (Lawless, 2012). This complicates the 
question of recruitment among Black people significantly, but does not necessarily contradict the 
rest of the literature. It is possible that Black candidates are approached frequently, but either do 
not follow through themselves due to their low ambition, or are not adequately supported by 
party infrastructure. It is my opinion that the second possibility is more likely, as tokenism is 
widespread in American politics, and the act of reaching out to Black candidates may be 
sufficient to signal racial equality without actually pursuing it.  
CATEGORY III: FUNDRAISING 
 Much more research has been done on the topic of fundraising among people of color 
than on the topics of ambition and recruitment, but this field also focuses overwhelmingly on 
Black candidates rather than candidates of color generally. That said, many of the claims made 
about fundraising among Black candidates may be generalizable to candidates of color generally, 
since many of the claims rely on the social and economic oppression faced by Black people 
which is also a fact of life, albeit in different forms, for other people of color.  
 Albright’s historical materialist approach is again helpful to adopt here. Social groups 
that have been historically oppressed struggle more than other groups in attempting to reach 
office for several reasons – for example, they generally are less educated, make less money, and 
hold worse jobs than their oppressors. Education, money, and employment all help candidates 
fundraise in different capacities – education and employment help a candidate appear more 
electable and attract more donors, and money helps pay for advertisements which can solicit 
more money (Albright 2014). Overton points out a specific example which is helpful for fleshing 
out Albright’s general trend: discriminatory policies regarding housing were in place until 
relatively recently in United States history, which has had the effect of concentrating people of 
color in poorer areas relative to Whites. A related fact is the large concentration of Black people 
in the south, where the history of racism and oppression makes it very difficult for nonwhite 
candidates to fundraise – the place where most Black people live is also the place where Black 
candidates raise the least money (Albright 2014). Since the candidate who raises the most money 
often (but certainly not always) wins, these fundraising disadvantages faced by candidates of 
color by virtue of their demographic characteristics make it much harder for them to beat their 
White opponents. 
 Because people of color tend to have less wealth than Whites, they have to rely more on 
fundraising during their candidacies (Overton 2002). This is unfortunate, because candidates of 
color find it difficult to raise as much money as White candidates, and in fact, typically raise 
substantially less money than them (Albright 2014; Conti 2002). As discussed above, donors 
usually support people who look like them; people of color are much less likely than Whites to 
make large donations of over 200 dollars. Further, donors are a uniquely invested subset of 
people, in that they literally have invested money into candidates. Donors make donations to 
candidates that they believe can win, since if “their” candidate wins, they didn’t waste their 
money. This raises the issue of “candidate viability” again, which, as has been well-established 
by now, is essentially a stand-in for “white maleness.” Candidates of color are seen as less likely 
to win, therefore as less viable, therefore as “bad investments,” and donors donate to them less 
often (Conti 2002). 
The vast majority of candidates raise most of their money from large corporate interests. 
These interests are unlikely to align themselves with minority candidates because they often 
assume that these candidates will be single-issue politicians focused exclusively on minority 
rights, which these interests are not typically interested in (Conti 2002). Whereas PACs exist to 
offset this issue for women and, as will be discussed, for queer candidates, I have been unable to 
find PACs of similar magnitude dedicated to financially supporting people of color. As a result, 
Black candidates, like women, rely heavily on grassroots support, but they struggle to find as 
much of it as White women do. 
 Voters in low-information races will use demographic characteristics as shorthand to 
decide who to support, and to whom to donate. Low-information donors typically donate based 
on partisanship (Thomson & Swers 2017; Albright 2014), and will often use race as a stand-in 
for partisanship and ideology within the party (Albright 2014). For example, moderate 
Democrats, when faced with a primary with one White and one Black candidate, might identify 
the White candidate as more moderate based on nothing other than the fact that the Black 
candidate is nonwhite, and decide to donate to the White candidate as a result. Of course, this 
goes both ways – people often assume that people of color are more progressive by default, so 
progressives might donate to people of color instead of their White opponents – but it tends to 
disadvantage candidates of color (Albright 2014). 
 As a brief aside, it is worth noting that not all donors think the same way. Hispanic 
donors, for example, seem to be unique among American donors in that they emphasize in-
person contact with their candidate of choice, as well as heavily considering the opinions of 
community influencers like churches before deciding to make any donations. While an email 
campaign might convince individual White people to donate, if a candidate wants the financial 
support of Hispanic donors, they’re going to have to adopt a more personable, community-based 
approach (Albright 2014). I was not able to find similar information on Black or Asian donors, 
but because of the paucity of research on this subject, I am not comfortable claiming that such 
information does not exist – it is entirely possible that Black and Asian communities feel that 
they are not correctly approached by political campaigns, and as a result, do not donate as much 
as they otherwise could. 
 While much of my focus in this literature review up to now has been on abstractions and 
broad social or economic claims, I would now like to look at the work of Conti, Overton, and 
Smith (separately, in 2002, 2002, and 2006 respectively) to 1. examine the incredibly broad 
impact of a specific piece of legislation and 2. synthesize a claim about the nature of the 
campaign finance system. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 banned the use of 
“unregulated soft money” in federal elections – this means that grassroots organizations made up 
of individual donors can no longer pool their money together and contribute it in large lump 
sums. In essence, this piece of legislation destroyed a lot of smaller, non-corporate fundraising 
organizations (Smith 2006). However, the BCRA did replace these organizations with federally-
recognized 527 groups. These “527s” theoretically fulfill the same purpose as the grassroots 
organizations they replaced, but do so under the eye of federal regulators. However, in practice 
527s are overwhelmingly White, whereas the organizations they replaced were often run by 
minorities (Smith 2006). People of color who come from poorer communities often don’t have 
the resources or knowledge to officially form a 527, whereas White people find it much easier. 
The BCRA has severely impacted the ability of candidates of color to raise money from 
individuals. 
 The socioeconomic research done by Conti, Overton, and Smith, combined with 
Albright’s historical materialist perspective (although I should note that he never calls himself an 
historical materialist explicitly), suggests that the private campaign finance system is inherently 
biased against candidates of color. It advantages candidates who: already possess a good deal of 
capital, come from wealthier areas, physically resemble the socially and economically dominant 
class, can attract corporate interests by seeming not to have a racial agenda, and can benefit from 
the demographic makeup of both “soft money” (which typically comes from 527s, corporations, 
and some PACs) and “hard money” (which typically comes from individual donors and PACs) 
donors. Candidates of color are lucky if they can benefit from one of those factors, whereas the 
average White candidate benefits from most or all of them. Of course, the campaign finance 
system is much more than what I have listed above, but those factors are undeniably important, 
and the fact that they are all opposed to candidates of color by virtue of their demographic 
characteristics indicates that candidates of color are institutionally discriminated against in a way 
that neither female nor queer candidates are.  
DEMOGRAPHIC III: QUEER PEOPLE 
CATEGORY I: AMBITION 
 The literature on queer candidates is extremely sparse, moreso than either of the previous 
demographics I’ve considered by a wide margin. As a result, much of what follows is taken from 
scholarship about queer people that is not directly related to my three areas of study – although 
some is – but rather, is related to factors which have been shown to affect the other 
demographics I’ve studied. From these bits of scholarship, I can make extrapolations relevant to 
this thesis. That said, those works I could find which directly relate to my thesis are given 
priority here. I take the term “queer” to be a broadly inclusive one, incorporating people who are 
gay, bisexual, and transgendered. I made the decision to include transgendered people in what 
would otherwise be a study of sexuality in candidates because transgendered people face 
discrimination remarkably similar to that which gay or bisexual people face—moral panics, 
categorical invalidation, and occasional instances of outright violence—as well as because a 
transgender identity, much like sexuality, is not always immediately visible. A transgendered 
person who has taken a hormone regimen might be considered to “pass” as their preferred gender 
identity, or they may elect not to take hormones at all, in which case they would not necessarily 
be visibly transgendered. Since the concealable nature of sexuality is essential to differentiating 
it from other demographic categories, and since the “LGBT” designation already includes 
transgendered people, I do not feel that it is controversial to include them in my analysis of queer 
candidates.  
 The issue of “candidate viability” again appears when dealing with queer candidates. 
America has not, to our knowledge, ever elected a queer president; we have elected very few 
queer Congresspeople, and while the numbers are higher for lower-stakes local offices (Haider-
Markel 2010), those offices are not widely publicized to the national voting-age populace. As 
such, if we accept the idea that queer people have always existed in some form or another and 
are not a novel phenomenon, we have to wonder why so few queer people serve in office. If the 
nationwide estimate that 3% of Americans are queer is correct, queer people would need to 
occupy 500% more offices than they currently do to be truly representative (Haider-Markel 
2010). It is easy to conclude that queer people are too strange, either too effeminate or too 
masculine, and too progressive to succeed in an election, or to conclude that most people are too 
bigoted to vote for queer candidates. As a result, people don’t vote for them, and the stereotypes 
lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy of unviability (Doan & Haider-Markel 2010). Queer people are 
aware of these stereotypes, as well as of the bigotry that many Americans still hold against them 
– according to a 2010 survey, the mean feeling towards “gays and lesbians” in America on a 
favorability scale was “unfavorable” (Haider-Markel 2010) – and as a result, may suffer from 
depressed political ambition. Keeping in mind that every candidate runs strategically, when and 
where they think they can win, queer candidates can reasonably be expected to worry that they 
will never win, and they can be expected to run at extremely low rates.  
 While the above is based on speculation and stereotyping, there has been some research 
done as to whether Americans are actually willing to vote for queer candidates. In an experiment 
in which voters were presented with hypothetical candidates, all of whom had randomized policy 
positions and demographic traits, voters were less likely to vote for a gay or lesbian candidate; 
this held at the .001 level of significance (Golebiowska & Thomsen 1999). Another study shows 
that people who are religious, conservative, and male tend to be less likely to vote for gay or 
lesbian candidates (Haider-Markel 2010).  
The Golebiowska and Thomsen study complicates its own results by reminding us that 
sexuality is a concealable trait; if the sexuality of a hypothetical candidate was revealed to these 
voters after all of the other policy positions and demographic traits were, voters were not less 
likely to choose them. This suggests that a queer candidate can be successful if they hide their 
sexuality until late in the race or after their election, which raises interesting questions about how 
queer candidates can run strategically. Not all queer candidates can hide their queerness – a 
transgendered person in transition taking hormones, for example, might undergo physical 
changes over the course of a campaign, or, more simply, a gay candidate might have a same-sex 
spouse whose existence they can’t conceal. Further, in terms of strategic considerations in 
running for office, hiding what many queer people view to be an essential component of their 
self is extremely drastic. Even if queer candidates can take that step, they might not be willing to 
demean themselves by doing so. Taking into consideration that one of the demographics which is 
opposed to queer people is men, queer candidates would find it difficult to move to a district with 
more favorable demographics to them – while it may be easy for a Black person to run for office 
in a primarily Black district, men are everywhere. To top it all off, queer people feel the same 
pressure that women feel in terms of qualifications; they need to be more experienced and better 
prepared than the average straight candidate to feel as qualified as the average straight candidate. 
All of this combines to show that the strategic considerations queer candidates have to take to 
run for office are extremely stringent, which suggests that queer people on the whole should have 
extremely depressed political ambition. 
CATEGORY II: FUNDRAISING 
 Information on fundraising for queer candidates was the hardest to come by during my 
research. Most of the little that follows is extrapolation. Recall that gay and lesbian candidates 
face stereotypes that serve to reduce their perceived candidate viability, and that donors tend to 
support candidates that they believe can win, since they view their donation as an investment; 
since most people seem to think that gay and lesbian candidates cannot win, it follows that out 
queer candidates would struggle to raise money from individual donors. Closeted queer 
candidates may benefit from the fact that donors tend to donate to people who share 
demographic characteristics with them – after all, members of any demographic, barring 
heterosexuals, can be queer – but I was unable to find any research which specifically addressed 
that point, and it does rely on candidates concealing their queerness.  
It is worth noting here that, in a survey of state legislators, queer legislators indicated that 
they didn’t struggle with fundraising from small donors, and praised the existence of a PAC 
dedicated to helping queer candidates win office (Haider-Markel 2010). The stated purpose of 
the LGBTQ Victory Fund (formerly the Gay & Lesbian Victory Fund) is to help elect openly 
queer candidates, and it is a non-partisan group, so queer Republicans shouldn’t face the same 
fundraising issues that female Republicans do. That said, these state legislators almost always 
ran unopposed or without a primary, which substantially decreased their fundraising needs – 
another example of the increased strategic considerations that queer candidates must make. 
CATEGORY III: RECRUITMENT 
 Recall that when dealing with recruitment, it is important to consider both the perceptions 
of recruiters and the reality of the American voters. In the case of queer recruitment, however, 
perception and reality seem to be unfortunately much closer than in the case of female 
recruitment. Recall that gay and lesbian candidates are widely stereotyped, and that these 
stereotypes lead people to conclude that they are unelectable. At the same time, though, 
experiments have shown that people are less likely to vote for queer candidates – recall also the 
brief discussion of the average perception of queer people and queer candidates above. Further 
experiments show that over a quarter of surveyed voters would oppose a hypothetical gay or 
lesbian candidate, and that 17% and 13% of surveyed voters identify gay candidates as “less 
moral” and “less electable” respectively (Doan & Haider-Markel 2010). In this instance, the 
fears of recruiters may be justified. 
 We could imagine that gender affinity would help queer women get recruited by the few 
female recruiters that do exist, but it seems that sexuality trumps gender. Surveyed women were 
more likely to accept negative stereotypes about gay women than about gay men – being gay 
may make it even harder for women to be recruited (Doan & Haider-Markel 2010). There is a 
theory, put forth in a 1999 study, that as gay issues become more mainstream, people are more 
likely to accept gay people; in this theory, bigotry is a result of a lack of exposure to the queer 
“other” (Haeberle 1999). Supporting this theory is a positive trend of acceptance of homosexual 
rights from 1992 to 1996, when the right of gays to serve in the military was being publicly 
debated and considered by the Clinton administration. Not all of this coverage was positive, of 
course – the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was arguably a step backwards in gay rights – but 
the simple fact that gay people were in the public eye seems to have made straight people less 
hateful towards them. If Haeberle’s theory is true, widespread acceptance of queer people should 
come naturally over time. I would argue, however, and I believe Haider-Markel would support 
this argument, that Haeberle’s theory is not true. Acceptance for gay rights seems to have largely 
plateaued with the federal legalization of gay marriage, and surveyed voters from 2007 were 
actually less willing than surveyed voters from 1999 to vote for a gay presidential candidate 
(Haider-Markel 2010). As such, public support for queer candidates will likely not increase 
naturally, and recruiters will likely not be more willing to take risks on queer candidates of their 
own accord. 
 At this point, I would like to discuss the self-fulfilling prophecy surrounding 
“electability” which has been referenced by several researchers so far. A survey of university 
students in an Intro Government class in 1999 revealed that even those students who indicated 
their willingness to vote for gay candidates believed that gay candidates are less electorally 
viable than straight candidates (Herrick & Thomas 1999). This mirrors an assumption voters 
make all the time, but especially, it seems, with regard to queer candidates: “Other people won’t 
vote for a candidate with x characteristic, and I don’t want to throw my vote away, so neither 
will I.” In fact, at various points in Haider-Markel’s research, he notes that surveyed people 
indicate that they, personally, would support a gay candidate, but that they do not believe other 
people would do the same. That voters make strategic considerations is not inherently a bad 
thing, but it seems that, in the case of minority candidates, voters tend to make strategic 
considerations that maintain the status quo of oppression and underrepresentation. As long as 
that status quo is maintained and visible to recruiters, queer candidates will be under-recruited. 
 There is one hope for queer recruitment, however. Another study done in 1999 indicates 
that “cultural elites,” i.e. well-educated members of the upper class, tend to be more tolerant of 
gay rights than the general public (Schroedel 1999). This study surveyed a random sample of 
elected officials at the state and local levels, and found that in nearly all categories, the elected 
officials held gay people and gay issues in a higher regard than the national average. This is 
potentially significant because cultural elites are far more likely to be recruiters than the average 
person – while political activists are used to recruit potential candidates, so are former 
officeholders and party chairs. Thus, any given recruiter might choose to recruit based on their 
personal beliefs, rather than their analysis of the American voting base as a whole, and if that’s 
the case, they might be more amenable to queer people than the rest of this research suggests. Of 
course, this advantage relies on recruiters making a strategic decision based on personal 
preference rather than strategic logic, and that may not be a common occurrence, but it does 
indicate that potential queer candidates are not in a completely hopeless situation. 
III: Hypotheses 
 The following are nine hypotheses I’ve formulated based on my review of the literature. 
By testing these hypotheses for the three election cycles I’ve gathered data on, I am able to 
conclude whether different disadvantaged demographic groups face substantially different 
challenges in running for office. I would like to note again that, because most of the literature on 
people of color focuses specifically on Black people, my theses on people of color tend to focus 
on Black people; however, in the Results & Discussion section, I will broaden my analysis to 
include the other racial groups I collected data for. 
 
 
• Hypothesis One: The gender gap in ambition should persist across all racial 
demographics. 
o Sub-hypothesis: The gender gap in ambition should vary in magnitude between 
different racial groups. 
My first hypothesis is already well-established (cf. Lawless 2012), and a foundational point for 
much of the literature on the ambition gap (cf. Doherty, Dowling, & Miller 2019). More 
informative is the sub-hypothesis, which is key to my assumption that the gender gap in ambition 
is much larger in White women than in women of color. If this is the case, then the heavy focus 
on the ambition problem among women privileges the problems faced by White women at the 
expense of the problems faced by women of color. 
• Hypothesis Two: Black people overall should be less politically ambitious than White 
people. 
This point is heavily disputed in the literature, but for the sake of formulating this hypothesis, I 
oppose Conti’s claim that Black people don’t have an ambition problem (Conti 2002). Ambition 
is not the central focus of his work, whereas it is the central focus of the work of researchers like 
Lawless and Fox, who disagree with his claim (Lawless, & Fox 2005; Lawless 2012).  
• Hypothesis Three: Black candidates should lose at substantially higher rates than White 
candidates. 
o Sub-hypothesis: Black women should win at a higher rate than Black men do. 
Here I formulate a hypothesis which emerged naturally from the literature, but which is not 
otherwise a central focus of my project. Based on Shah’s research (Shah 2014) I expect that 
Black women should win at a higher rate than Black men do even on a national level, even 
though Black candidates win less often than White candidates do overall. 
• Hypothesis Four: Queer people should demonstrate extremely depressed political 
ambition. 
Based primarily on the work of Haider-Markel, I claim here that queer people should 
demonstrate expressive ambition at an extremely low rate, which helps explain why we have so 
few queer Congresspeople (Haider-Markel 2010; Doan & Haider-Markel 2010). While this 
hypothesis is basic, given the remarkable paucity of research on queer candidates, it is an 
important foundation to establish. 
• Hypothesis Five: Female candidates should be able to raise as much money as male 
candidates. 
This hypothesis is derived from the work of many political science researchers who claim that 
women face an ambition, not a fundraising, problem (Sanbonmatsu 2015; Barber, Butler, & 
Preece 2016; Lawless 2012). My expectation is that this will be proven true, but I will take an 
intersectional approach and account for race as well as gender in my testing. 
• Hypothesis Six: People of color overall, especially women of color, should struggle to 
raise money as compared to White people. 
My sixth hypothesis is based heavily on the research of Conti and Albright (Conti 2002; Albright 
2005) which argues that candidates of color still face remarkable institutional barriers when it 
comes to successfully fundraising. 
• Hypothesis Seven: Democratic female candidates should be able to raise more money 
than Republican female candidates. 
This is another hypothesis that was not originally a focus area but which grew naturally from the 
literature review; based on claims made by Francia and Thomson and Swers (Francia 2008; 
Thomson & Swers 2017), I expect that Democratic women will be able to fundraise much more 
successfully than Republican women, since they will have an advantage in both numbers of 
individual donors and institutional support from PACs. 
• Hypothesis Eight: A gender affinity effect in donors should exist, such that female 
candidates receive more donations from female donors than male candidates do. 
The gender affinity effect idea comes from Thomson and Swers, and relies on the notion that 
donors donate to people who look like them, with gender being one of the strongest and most 
easily-identifiable traits (Thomson & Swers 2017). This is an important hypothesis because men 
have historically held, and in many ways still hold, financial advantages over women, so if 
women receive fewer male donors, they may struggle to fundraise as successfully as men. 
• Hypothesis Nine: Queer candidates should be able to fundraise as successfully as non-
queer candidates. 
This hypothesis is based on the extremely limited literature on fundraising among queer 
candidates. One of Haider-Markel’s studies indicates that queer state legislators self-reported not 
having struggle to fundraise (Haider-Markel 2010), so my assumption is that queer candidates 
should fundraise about as well as non-queer candidates. 
 
IV: Data 
 In order to test the hypotheses that I’ve derived from the literature, I decided to look at 
federal-level candidate data. While I ideally would have been able to devise metrics to test 
ambition, fundraising, and recruitment, it proved prohibitively difficult to collect quantitative 
data on recruitment. This type of data is typically gathered by interviewing current or former 
candidates, which is not something I could accomplish. Alternatively, this type of data may be 
gathered by reading candidate memoirs, but since I am dealing with modern candidates, the 
majority of whom achieved little or no success in their electoral pursuits, such literature was not 
available. As such, I was only able to gather data to test the ambition and fundraising portions of 
my research. While this is an unfortunate setback, it does not invalidate the rest of my research. 
 I chose to look at federal-level candidates, specifically Congressional candidates, because 
I wanted to look at data which is nationally representative and readily available. Since much of 
this research relies on demographic characteristics, I did not want to choose any single state, as 
that would privilege the demographic makeup over that of the nation’s. Further, Congressional 
elections are more heavily publicized than local elections, so while it would be possible to find 
ballots with basic information for local candidates, it would likely have been prohibitively 
difficult to research the ethnicities and sexualities of local candidates. In order to establish a 
continuity over time and create a wider pool of candidates, I chose to gather data on 
Congressional candidates from the 2014, 2016, and 2018 election cycles.  
 I began by gathering data on Congressional candidates from Ballotpedia, a non-profit, 
non-partisan group founded in 2007 and dedicated to recording information about state- and 
federal-level elections. This website provides the name of every candidate who appeared on the 
primary ballot in each district’s Congressional election for every Congressional election cycle, as 
well as a biography of varying lengths of every candidate for whom information is forthcoming. 
Ballotpedia’s lists allowed me to collect the names, party affiliations, districts, desired chambers, 
and genders of every candidate in the three election cycles I’m studying, as well as whether or 
not they won.  
These lists also often, but not always, provided information on the candidates’ ethnicities. 
When this information was not available on Ballotpedia, I conducted independent research into 
the candidate’s history, which was usually, but not always, successful. When I could not find 
information on a given candidate’s ethnicity, I recorded it as N/A. I determined a candidate’s 
ethnicity by looking at their physical appearance, family name, and history of affiliation with 
organizations for racial or ethnic activism. If a candidate’s ethnicity was ultimately not clear to 
me beyond a shadow of a doubt, I recorded it as N/A. The five ethnic categories I recorded are: 
White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and “other,” where “other” represents primarily Native American 
and Indian candidates. I collapsed these groups into a single “other” category because there were 
very few candidates from them, and because the literature has not focused on Native American 
or Indian experiences.  
The last demographic information I collected is information on sexuality. I divided 
sexuality into three categories: queer, non-queer, and N/A. In order to learn about candidates’ 
sexualities, I looked into news articles and interviews they gave during or leading up to their 
election cycles that discuss sexuality. When a candidate expressly stated in their own words that 
they are trans or have a nonnormative sexual orientation, I recorded them as queer. When a 
candidate expressed homophobic opinions, I recorded them as non-queer. Additionally, when a 
candidate intentionally positioned themselves as an ally of queer people, I recorded them as non-
queer; I acknowledge that this is a contentious decision, but my belief is that candidates who 
position themselves as allies are implicitly positioning themselves as queer-adjacent, but not 
queer. Finally, if no conclusive information was forthcoming, I recorded a candidate as N/A. The 
majority of candidates did not talk about their sexuality, so most of them are recorded as N/A; 
since sexuality is easily concealed and can be tricky to nail down even when candidates are 
forthcoming about discussing it, I thought it would be smartest to err on the side of caution. That 
said, at final tally each election cycle had at least 690 candidates recorded as queer or non-queer, 
which is enough of a sample size for me to feel comfortable carrying on with my analysis of 
sexuality. As a final note, I recognize that the validity of these data relies on candidates 
accurately representing their sexual identities to the media; while this is a possible stumbling 
block, I believe that sexuality is a central enough aspect of an individual’s existence that 
misrepresenting it consistently for the entirety of a campaign season would be an extreme rarity. 
The ambition I measure in this study is expressive ambition. While I would have liked to 
study nascent ambition, quantifying nascent ambition is difficult even with unlimited resources, 
and would have again required an extensive series of interviews with candidates, which was not 
feasible. My measure of expressive ambition is binary: if a candidate’s name appeared on the 
primary ballot for a given election cycle, they have expressive ambition. As a result, my 
candidate pool is comprised entirely of people who have expressive ambition. My study is not 
designed to distinguish between people who are and people who are not ambitious; instead, I 
distinguish between the different demographic characteristics within the larger population of 
people who are ambitious. 
I collected fundraising data from the Center for Responsive Politics’ OpenSecrets project, 
another non-partisan non-profit which is dedicated to making the fundraising sources of 
candidates easily accessible to the public. Specifically, I used the OpenSecrets “Bulk Data” on 
campaign financing for 2014, 2016, and 2018. Each election cycle has five attached datasets, 
only two of which are relevant to my project: the individual-level donations and the candidate-
level donations. The individual-level donations include donor names, donation amounts, the 
number of donations made by each donor, the Candidate ID (CID) number for each donation 
recipient, and many other categories of information which are not relevant to this thesis. I used 
the candidate-level dataset because the individual-level dataset included the CID of the recipient, 
but not the recipient’s name; the candidate-level dataset attaches the candidates’ names to their 
respective CIDs, so I combined these two datasets for ease of use. 
In order to combine all of these data into one usable format, I took the hand-collected 
demographic data, the individual-level donor data from OpenSecrets, and the candidate-level 
donor data from OpenSecrets, and synthesized them into one dataset. I first combined the 
individual- and donor-level data from OpenSecrets by the CID, which attached the candidates’ 
names to the individual donations made to them, and then combined that new dataset with my 
hand-collected data by the candidate name. My final datasets for each election cycle are 
comprised of: donor name, donation amount, candidate name, and candidate party, district, 
win/loss status, chamber, gender, race, and sexuality. 
Finally, there are several extreme outliers in the data. These outliers always come from a 
subset of candidates of color, and do not seem to favor one gender or the other. In my final 
analyses, I removed these outliers so that they would not skew the data; the attached charts are 
presented without the outliers. As an example of one of the removed outliers, in 2018 
Congressman Pete Aguilar (D) raised approximately one hundred times the amount of any other 
Hispanic candidate. He skewed every fundraising metric to such a degree that, when he was 
removed from the dataset, the results were radically different. There are several other candidates 
with similar results, including a female Asian candidate and a male “other” candidate from 2016. 
In these cases, the outliers were easy to identify by a cursory manual scan of the data, due to the 
small sample sizes and obvious size disparities. However, the Hispanic subsets in 2016 and 2018 
contained candidates that were not obviously outliers, but which may have been skewing the data 
upward. In order to determine whether these data should be considered outliers, I use Tukey’s 
fences; any datapoint which is a distance of more than 1.5 times the interquartile range either 
above the 75th percentile or below the 25th percentile, I consider an outlier and remove. This 
ultimately shrinks the subset slightly, and displays results more in line with the other two 
election cycles and with the literature’s predictions. I recognize that my decision to remove these 
outliers may be controversial. However, my intent in presenting the data is to present the 
experience of the average candidate from any given demographic, and by noting the existence of 
these several extreme outliers here, I hope to provide as comprehensive an analysis as possible. 
V: Results 
 I have arranged my hypothesis tests categorically, such that the first four are related to 
political ambition and the last five are related to fundraising. Note that due to the heterogeneous 
nature of the “other” racial demographic category, I do not include that category in any of my 
tables or charts; while it is useful for the categorization of candidates who do not fit into the 
widely-studied demographics in the literature, it is not helpful for analysis, since the category 
itself is not an effective measurement of any given demographic.  
The first hypothesis and sub-hypothesis are simple, but extremely significant for my 
research. My expectation is that the gender gap in ambition will, in accordance with the 
literature, persist across racial categories, but that the size of the gap will vary substantially 
between them, such that referring to “the gender ambition gap in women” without paying 
attention to race is insufficient for explaining the experiences of minority women. I express my 
measure of ambition by dividing the number of women running in any given demographic by the 
number of men running in the same demographic. Since there are always fewer female 
candidates than male candidates, this provides a number between zero and one. As the number 
approaches one, the gender gap in ambition approaches nonexistence; in other words, a value of 
one means that the number of women and men running is exactly equal, and a value of zero 
means that there are no women running. My belief, based on my assumption that the experiences 
of White women tend to overshadow those of women of color, is that White women will have 
the smallest value, indicating the largest ambition gap. 
 My results reflect my prediction. In all three years studied, the gender ambition gap is 
larger among White candidates than in any other female demographic. In fact, the gender 
ambition gap among White candidates is more than twice as large as the gap among Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian candidates for all three election cycles studied here (Tables 1.1 – 1.3). These 
data reveal a few interesting trends. First, the ratio of politically ambitious women to men 
increases each election cycle across all racial demographics with one very slight exception, with 
a massive jump in 2018. Second, and more notably, the large increase in female candidates 
running in 2018 was not limited to White women. Because of the very high number of female 
candidates running in the 2018 midterms cycle, 2018 has been dubbed by some as a second 
“Year of the Woman.” Whatever happened to spur an increase in ambition in women seems to 
have affected women across racial divides. That said, White women did see far more growth 
than women of other racial demographics, but significantly more Black, Hispanic, and Asian 
women ran for office in 2018 than did in 2016.  
Table 1.1: Gender Ambition Gap Data for 2018 
  
  
  
Table 1.2: Gender Ambition Gap Data for 2016 
 
 
Table 1.3: Gender Ambition Gap Data for 2018 
 
Race: White Black Hispanic Asian 
Total Numbers: 205/1198 41/108 24/60 8/14 
Ratio: 0.171 0.380 0.40 0.571 
Race: White Black Hispanic Asian 
Total Numbers: 221/1318 61/132 34/82 11/18 
Ratio: 0.168 0.462 0.415 0.611 
Race: White Black Hispanic Asian 
Total Numbers: 361/1445 83/135 51/87 16/21 
Ratio: 0.250 0.615 0.586 0.762 
 As a note on the above analysis, the number of Asian candidates in all three election 
cycles is so low as to make me hesitant to make any claims about the gender ambition gap 
among Asian candidates. The literature, when it mentions Asian candidates at all, concludes that 
Asians are one of the least politically ambitious racial demographics in America; my findings 
support this conclusion. However, the literature also suggests that Asian women should display 
extremely low ambition relative to Asian men, and my findings show that the gender gap in 
ambition among Asian candidates is consistently the lowest. In the studied election cycles, the 
number of Asian candidates never surpassed fifty, and the number of Asian women never 
surpassed twenty. It is possible that Asian women who do have nascent ambition, although there 
are very few of them, are more likely to turn that nascent ambition into expressive ambition, 
perhaps as a reaction to the remarkably low numbers of Asians in general and Asian women in 
particular serving in office. However, my study is not equipped to identify nascent ambition, and 
I will leave further discussion of this subject to future researchers. 
 To test the second hypothesis, I need to compare the ambition of Black people to the 
ambition of White people. Because my study treats expressive ambition as a binary variable and 
only notes those candidates who possess it, I compare my numbers, which represent the pool of 
candidates for a given election cycle, to the national population numbers. My intent is to 
determine whether a certain demographic is more or less ambitious than they would be were 
ambition distributed proportionally among demographic groups. If ambition were distributed 
proportionally, the percentage of candidates from a given demographic in the candidate pool 
should be equal to the percentage of the population that that demographic comprises. If a certain 
demographic makes up a higher or lower percentage of the candidate pool than they do of the 
population, that demographic is more or less ambitious than they should be, were ambition 
distributed proportionally. By using this concept of the proportional distribution of ambition as a 
baseline, I can establish the expressive ambition of racial demographics relative to each other. 
In order to establish the relative ambition of Black and White people, I compare the 
percentage of Black and White candidates running in a given election cycle to the percentage of 
the population that is made up of Black and White people, respectively. For example, in 2014, 
the United States Census reports that approximately 13% of the population was Black, while my 
data show that only 9% of candidates were Black (US Census Bureau, 2014). On the other hand, 
the Census reports that approximately 73% of the population was White, while my data show 
that White candidates made up 75% of the total candidate pool. This means that White people 
are proportionally slightly more ambitious than they should be, were political ambition 
proportionally distributed, and that Black people are slightly less so. The results are similar for 
every election cycle tested, with both the population percentages and the candidate pool 
percentages remaining roughly the same (Chart 1.1). Thus, at least for the 2014 – 2018 election 
cycles, the percentage of Black candidates running is lower than the percentage of Black people 
in the population, while the percentage of White candidates running is higher than the percentage 
of White people in the population. Based on this, I conclude that the expressive ambition of 
White people is higher than the expressive ambition of Black people.  
 
  
 
 
I can test my third hypothesis and its corresponding sub-hypothesis using only the data I 
have collected. The literature overall suggests that Black candidates should lose at higher rates 
than White candidates do, and Shah’s study found that, within the Black candidate pool, Black 
women win more often than Black men do. In order to make my study more inclusive, I test the 
win rates of all the demographics of people of color I collected data for, as well as looking at the 
win rates among their gender breakdowns. 
 My data show that, for the most part, win ratios among racial demographics tend to hover 
around 50/50. Of the White, Black, and Asian candidates, roughly fifty percent of them won and 
fifty percent of them lost in every election cycle studied (Chart 2.1). Hispanic candidates exhibit 
the same trend in 2016 and 2018, but in 2014, 67% of the Hispanic candidates who ran for office 
won. In 2014 and 2018, only about 30% of the candidates I’ve listed as “other” won – recall that 
these are mostly Indian and Native American candidates. However, the sample size of these 
candidates is consistently very small, so I am again hesitant to draw any conclusions here.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The more interesting data come from my analyses of the win ratios broken down by race 
and gender. In the vast majority of cases, the women in a given racial demographic had a better 
win ratio than the men in the same demographic (Charts 2.2 – 2.4). This means that, in 
accordance with Shah’s data, Black women, when they run, are more likely than Black men to 
win – but it also means the same for White women and Asian women. Hispanics are the only 
demographic category in which women consistently have win ratios only as good as or worse 
than men.  
Pausing for a moment, I should note that electoral success is not one of the three 
categories I chose to study and focus on in the literature. However, it did prove easy to collect 
data for, and it did come up in the literature while I was studying my core areas of interest. As 
such, I will talk briefly about the implications of these data and then return to my focus areas. 
First, it should be noted that more men run for office than women, and since the number of seats 
is a limiting factor, it is a given that, when enough men run, a lot of them are going to lose. With 
only 535 seats available and well over one thousand men running, it is statistically impossible for 
more men to win than lose, and I concede that this contributes in part to the trend I have 
discovered. However, I will point out that the women who are running are not only competing 
with other women, nor are the people of color running only competing with other members of 
their racial demographic – when it comes to seats as a limiting factor, everyone is competing 
with everyone else, and while districts will often see candidates who are predominantly of one 
racial demographic, that is not always the case. As such, the fact that the majority of women who 
run for office win office is significant because they’re in the same contest that their historically 
advantaged male counterparts are in, and they’re still able to win. If nothing else, this finding 
supports Lawless’ claim that women, when they do decide to run, win at rates comparable to 
men.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 When it comes to the ambition of queer candidates, the only hypothesis I synthesized 
from the literature is that queer people should display extremely depressed expressive ambition 
(hypothesis four). Like my second hypothesis, I will test this one by comparing the number of 
queer candidates who display expressive ambition to the number of queer people in the United 
States. There are a number of barriers that come with this hypothesis test. First, measuring the 
number of queer people in the United States is rarely a priority for any groups which possess the 
resources to do so, so finding these data at all is difficult. Further, these measurements are often 
inaccurate, since queer young people living with their parents may be hesitant to self-report as 
queer if they haven’t come out to their parents.  
 Despite these difficulties, I found a report which indicates that as of 2017 4.5% of the 
adult population was queer (Gallup Tracking, 2018). If political ambition were proportionally 
distributed among the population, 4.5% of the candidates from each election cycle would be 
queer. As expected, however, this is not the case. In 2014, only 1.3% of the candidates were 
queer; in 2016, 1.4%; and in 2018, 2.3%. While the upward trend is reassuring, the fact that only 
in 2018 was the percentage of queer candidates in the candidate pool even half of the percentage 
of queer people in the population is disheartening, if not surprising. 
 One of the central claims in the literature on female candidates is that women should be 
able to raise as much money as men; this prediction is my fifth hypothesis. Several sources claim 
that women have to work harder to accomplish the same fundraising goals as men, but most are 
in agreement that they can ultimately be as successful as men. Testing this hypothesis is 
remarkably simple, and I have three different metrics to do so. For each candidate in each 
election cycle, I’ve calculated the total amount of money they raised, the average number of 
individual donations, not donors, that they received, and the size of the average donation they 
received.  
 My data indicate that not only are women able to fundraise as well as men, they 
outperform men with some consistency (Charts 3.1 – 3.3). In 2014, the average female candidate 
received more donations than the average male candidate, but had a lower average donation and 
a lower average amount raised; this is essentially consistent with the literature, since much of it 
claims that women rely on small individual donations from many different donors. However, in 
2016, women had a higher average amount raised and a higher average donation count, and in 
2018, women outperformed men in all fundraising metrics. It is worth pointing out that perhaps 
the best metric for fundraising efficacy is the average total amount raised, since that is ultimately 
what determines a candidate’s ability to stay in a competitive race, and women raised more 
money than men on average in 2016 and 2018. Throughout this paper, when I refer to 
“successful” fundraising, I am heavily weighting this metric above the others. Further, the 
fundraising averages for women in all three metrics increase from 2014 to 2018, and while 
evidence from three samples is not necessarily enough to form a reliable trend, it is consistent 
with one. 
 It is possible that 2016 and 2018 are not representative election years as they relate to the 
fundraising of female candidates. In 2016, Hillary Clinton ran for president, and the presence of 
a massively-publicized and almost successful female presidential candidate may have provided a 
fundraising boost for women running for Congress. Similarly, 2018 was a flashpoint for female 
candidates, and they may have benefited from the atmosphere of confidence surrounding the 
second “Year of the Woman.” While I would feel more comfortable drawing conclusions based 
on these data with corroborating data from 2020, the trend mentioned above still stands. 
  
  
 In a similar vein, I hypothesize based on the literature that people of color overall, with a 
specific focus on Black people, should struggle to fundraise as compared to White people. This 
is my sixth hypothesis. I also took this as an opportunity to perform further intersectional 
analyses of race and gender, and how they relate to fundraising. The results of these analyses are 
extremely revealing. Most significantly, my analyses indicate that gender is not a significant 
obstacle to fundraising in any racial demographic. In every election year and in every racial 
demographic, the women fundraise about as well as the men. However, there is a definite 
difference between the success of fundraising by different races. 
 Unsurprisingly, White candidates tend to receive a higher average donation, a higher 
average amount raised, and a higher amount of donations than any other racial demographic. The 
most privileged category fundraises the most successfully. On the other hand, Black and 
Hispanic candidates tend to struggle, with Black candidates doing the worst overall (Charts 4.1 – 
4.3). Race seems to have a much more significant impact on fundraising ability than gender does, 
as Black women fare about as well as Black men, which is to say, not very well at all. Overall, 
the differences in fundraising capabilities between different racial demographics are very 
substantial, whereas the differences in capabilities between genders within the racial 
demographics are not (Charts 4.4 – 4.6). When we think about fundraising difficulties, then, we 
should think of them in terms of race, not in terms of gender. 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above analyses, I made a few unexpected discoveries. First, Asian 
candidates tend to be successful fundraisers – they don’t do as well as White candidates, but they 
are consistently closest, and the gap between Asian candidates and White candidates is not 
terribly large. While this may be a result of the small sample sizes associated with Asian 
candidates, it may also be reflective of the status of Asian-Americans as a “model minority,” 
which is sometimes hypothesized to face less discrimination than other minority groups. While 
the model minority stereotype is typically used to minimize the struggles faced by Asian-
Americans, it may benefit Asian candidates if donors perceive them as less disadvantaged than 
other minority candidates, and therefore more likely to win. Based on these data, I am reluctant 
to definitively make one conclusion or the other. Candidates from the “other” category see 
scattered results, and since the category is a bit of a catch-all, I am hesitant to make claims based 
on it even if the results are very suggestive of a particular outcome.  
 A further hypothesis I derived from the literature is that Democratic women should be 
able to raise more money than Republican women, since Democratic women have access to 
financial resources like PACs that Republican women don’t, and since they benefit from 
energizing a larger donor base than Republican women do (hypothesis seven). My findings are 
consistent with this hypothesis. In every election cycle I studied, Democratic female candidates 
had a higher average number of donors and a higher average amount raised (Charts 5.1 – 5.3). 
However, Republican female candidates consistently had a higher average donation. This raises 
the concern that the pattern might be based primarily on the partisanship of the candidate instead 
of the combined effect of partisanship and gender, since the stereotypical Democratic candidate 
will run a grassroots campaign that appeals to more donors while the stereotypical Republican 
candidate will run a campaign that appeals to wealthier donors who have more to give. 
 In order to test this possibility, I looked at the same fundraising numbers for Democratic 
and Republican men. No such pattern emerged; in some years the Democratic male candidates 
would receive fewer donations than the Republicans, and in some years the Democratic male 
candidates would receive a higher average donation than the Republicans (Charts 5.4 – 5.6). 
This, combined with the literature on partisanship and gender in fundraising, allows me to claim 
with confidence that Republican women find it harder to fundraise than Democratic women do. 
However, my data also indicate that Republican women actually find it harder to fundraise than 
men from either party as well – Republican women consistently underperform in all three 
fundraising metrics. The claim that female candidates can fundraise as well as male candidates, 
then, seems to refer primarily to Democratic female candidates, thus providing another clear 
example of broad claims overgeneralizing and privileging the experiences of one group over that 
of another. 
 My eighth hypothesis is that a gender affinity effect exists among donors, such that 
female candidates will receive more donations from women than male candidates do, and vice 
versa. Note that my claim is not that female candidates receive more donations from female 
donors than they do from male donors – men overwhelmingly make up the population of 
individual donors to political campaigns. However, of those women who do make donations, 
more of them are likely to donate to women than to men. On the other hand, male donors will 
primarily donate to male candidates. This is significant because men, being the more historically 
economically privileged gender, are likely to have more money to give, so a lack of male donors 
may harm a woman’s campaign fundraising opportunities. 
 My data indicate that the literature is correct. In the three election cycles I studied, the 
average male-female gender ratio among women was higher than it was among men, such that 
female candidates had a higher proportion of female donors than male candidates did. I then 
broke these results down by race, to determine whether a certain racial demographic is more 
palatable to female donors than others. This breakdown revealed two interesting points. First, the 
gender affinity effect persists across the races, with a few notable exceptions. In 2014 and 2016, 
female candidates from every racial demographic had a higher proportion of female donors than 
their male counterparts, except for those candidates from the “other” category (Chart 6.1 – 6.30).  
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Second, 2018 may be an anomalous year. While female candidates do have a higher 
proportion of female donors on average, when race is taken into account, Black, Hispanic, and 
Asian women actually received relatively fewer donations from women than their respective 
male counterparts. I am unable to account for this change. Not only did the gender affinity effect 
persist across the races in 2014 and 2016, the differences in the proportions were substantial.  
The data on gendered donations is further complicated by the fact that no pattern emerges based 
on this racial breakdown; the race with the biggest difference in gendered donor proportions 
changes each election year, and there is very little consistency. As such, beyond agreeing with 
the literature in the most general sense, I am hesitant to draw any conclusions from these data. It 
is possible that race does not factor into considerations of gendered donations, but it is also 
possible that these election cycles were unfit for this analysis for reasons that I am unaware of. 
 My ninth and final hypothesis is that queer candidates should be able to fundraise just as 
well as their non-queer counterparts. In order to test this, I check the same three fundraising 
metrics for the queer and non-queer subsets of my data. Of course, this is comparing a very large 
dataset to a very small dataset, and as such the results should be taken with a grain of salt, but the 
data are consistent across all three election cycles. As expected based on the limited literature on 
queer candidates, they fundraise about as well as non-queer candidates (Charts 7.1 – 7.3). They 
consistently raise slightly less money than non-queer candidates, but they do, with the notable 
exception of 2018, raise almost as much money as non-queer candidates on average. I 
acknowledge 2018 as an exception here because that year saw an outlier comparable to the 
outliers found in testing hypothesis six; after removing that outlier, the data for 2018 are 
comparable to the data for the other two years. Overall, while this is a subjective judgment, their 
numbers are similar enough not to appear problematic. If anything, when it comes to fundraising, 
sexuality seems to be much less of a factor than race, about on par with gender in terms of 
potential difficulties for demographically disadvantaged candidates. 
 
 
  
VI: Discussion 
 The major takeaways from these nine hypothesis tests are as follows. First, it is true that 
the gender gap in ambition persists across racial demographics. However, the size of that gap 
varies so significantly that, without an attention to that variance, any analysis of ambition is 
inadequate. Further, the size of the gap is consistently largest among White women, and is often 
more than twice the size among White women than among any other racial demographic.  This is 
significant because one of the primary claims in the literature is that women have to focus 
overwhelmingly on the gender gap in ambition if they want to increase their representation in 
government; this is certainly true for White women, but is not necessarily the case for any other 
racial demographic of women.  
 A related conclusion is that Black people are consistently less ambitious than White 
people. As a result, when dealing with depressed ambition in Black women, the correct area of 
focus may be race-based rather than gender-based, while White women likely do not suffer 
depressed ambition because of their race but because of their gender. The solutions to the 
ambition problem are not the same for different kinds of women, because the root causes of the 
ambition problem are not the same.  
 Another significant conclusion drawn from this analysis is that women, in accordance 
with the literature, are able to fundraise as well as men. However, this claim alone is inadequate. 
A more accurate claim is that women are able to fundraise as well as the men in their racial 
demographic; since Black and Hispanic candidates struggle to fundraise, stating that women can 
fundraise as well as men is technically true, but the conclusion which often follows, which is that 
fundraising is therefore not a problem for women, minimizes the experiences of some women of 
color in favor of the experiences of White women. 
 Partisanship is often not considered in questions of intersectionality. However, in this 
instance it is evident that the experiences of Republican and Democratic women are distinct. 
Democratic women find substantially more success in fundraising than Republican women do, 
whether as a result of the progressive ideology of female donors, the presence of PACs and other 
groups dedicated to financially supporting progressive women, or another unknown cause. This 
is another strike against the broad claim that women can fundraise as well as men. 
 My findings on the gender affinity effect are ultimately inconclusive. Data from 2014 and 
2016 seem to indicate that the gender affinity effect persists across all racial demographics, but 
data from 2018 strongly contradicts that finding. While it is possible that 2018 is an anomalous 
year, it is also possible that an unknown variable was present in 2018 that was not present in 
2014 and 2016, and my inability to identify that variable prevents me from making any further 
claims about the gender affinity effect.  
 Over the course of analyzing my fundraising data, I found several extreme outliers, all of 
which came from subsets of candidates of color. While I removed them with the intent of 
accurately portraying the fundraising capabilities of the average candidate from the relevant 
demographic, it is important to keep their existence in mind. Jose Aguilar, for example, raised 
more money than a majority of candidates in the 2016 election cycle, despite the fact that 
Hispanic candidates typically struggle to raise money. These outliers indicate that race is not a 
totally damning factor when it comes to fundraising success, although the conditions required to 
circumvent fundraising difficulties due to race are unknown based on my analysis. 
 It is plain to see that different demographic groups, especially intersectionally 
disadvantaged groups, face different disadvantages in campaigning. White women are successful 
fundraisers who face depressed ambition compared to White men, with the exception that 
Republican White women struggle to fundraise. Black women are more ambitious relative to 
Black men than White women are relative to White men, but face the problem of depressed 
ambition due to their racial demographic, and also, along with Hispanic women, struggle to 
fundraise. This should indicate that, not only is it inappropriate to make broad claims about 
demographic groups without intersectional considerations, but also that when those claims are 
made, they tend to benefit the least disadvantaged demographic group. In the broader category 
of “women,” I am comfortable saying that progressive White women face less severe economic 
and social disadvantages than any other subset; when researchers make broad claims about 
women as a whole, they tend to refer to the problems faced by progressive White women, which 
serves to further disadvantage women of color. 
 This research has a few major shortcomings. First, I failed to devise a metric for a 
quantitative analysis of recruitment. Such a metric would have been helpful in supporting my 
thesis, since recruiters seem to treat members of different demographic groups differently. Future 
research, perhaps performed by researchers with access to more resources, should include 
interviews with current and former candidates to ask whether they were recruited, how 
vigorously, whether it changed their minds, and so on. 
 Second, my research on queer candidates ultimately proved inconclusive. While I hope 
that the data I gathered on queer candidates is useful to future researchers, since very few 
researchers seem interested in conducting political science research on queer candidates, my 
sample sizes were so small that I am not comfortable making any conclusions based on them. 
Similarly, intersectional analyses based on sample sizes these small would be inconclusive, since 
they are relatively homogenous – mostly White, with a fair bit of gender diversity, but not 
enough diversity overall to make reliable conclusions.  
 Finally, much of the literature indicates that my research would have been better 
conducted on local political races as opposed to federal ones. Candidates of color tend to be 
more ambitious in local races, and there is some minimal evidence to suggest that queer 
candidates feel the same way. In point of fact, the very nature of this research suffers from the 
same problem my thesis is opposed to – by studying federal races, I privileged the experiences of 
the least disadvantaged groups. Future research may be better suited by adopting an approach 
similar to Shah’s, for example, with a multi-year study of a single state’s legislative elections.   
 Regardless of these shortcomings, the conclusions I have drawn still stand. Black women 
do not fundraise nearly as well as White women; Republican women do not fundraise as well as 
Democratic women; White women are not as ambitious compared to White men as Black 
women are compared to Black men. While these groups are all disadvantaged compared to 
straight White men, any analysis of their disadvantages which does not take a sufficiently 
intersectional approach provides an inadequate understanding of the difficulties faced by 
differently disadvantaged groups.  
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